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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper examines the performance of several panel data models to measure cost and 
scale efficiency in network industries. Network industries are characterized by a high degree 
of heterogeneity, much of which is network-specific and unobserved. The unaccounted-for 
heterogeneity can create bias in the inefficiency estimates. The stochastic frontier models that 
include additional firm-specific effects, such as the random-constant frontier model proposed 
by Greene (2004), can control for unobserved network effects that are random but time-
invariant. In cases like railway networks the unobserved heterogeneity is potentially 
correlated with other exogenous, but observed, factors such as network size and density. In 
such cases the correlation with explanatory variables may bias the coefficients of the cost 
function in a random-effects specification. However, these correlations can be integrated into 
the model using Mundlak’s (1978) formulation. The unobserved network effects and the 
resulting biases are studied through a comparative study of a series of stochastic frontier 
models. These models are applied to a panel of 50 railway companies operating over a 13-
year period in Switzerland. Different specifications are compared regarding the estimation of 
both cost frontier coefficients and inefficiency scores. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The railroad system in Switzerland consists of two sectors. The first sector includes the 
international and inter-regional transports. This sector is monopolized by the Swiss Federal 
Railways, which operates more than half of the railway networks in Switzerland. The second 
sector provides regional and local transport services that account for about a third of 
Switzerland’s railway passengers. This sector consists of 57 small private and regulated 
companies.1 These companies have regional monopoly in that they have an exclusive access 
to their assigned networks and different companies’ networks do not overlap with each other. 
Most of these companies have long-term contracts and are strongly subsidized by the cantons 
and the federal government. Given that most of Swiss cantons have financial problems, there 
is an increasing interest in the possibility of reducing the allocated subsidies by improving 
productive efficiency.  
The measurement of cost and scale efficiency in railway industry has been an important 
policy issue for the past several years in Switzerland. However, since these companies operate 
in different networks and environments, any method based on cost comparison has been 
subject to criticism.2 A high level of output heterogeneity is a general characteristic of 
network industries. Networks with different shapes have different organization and 
coordination problems, thus different costs. For instance, in the railway sector the production 
of 100 train-kilometers on a simple linear network is less costly than the same output in a Y-
shaped network. Other factors such as the density of stops can also affect the costs.  
                                                          
1 See Filippini and Maggi (1993) for more information. 
2 For instance, Filippini and Maggi (1993) estimated the efficiency level of the Swiss railways companies using 
Corrected OLS method, which in presence of a high heterogeneity in the production process, can lead to 
inaccurate inefficiency estimates. 
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Furthermore, different environmental characteristics influence the production process and 
therefore the costs. For instance, railway operation is more costly in a mountainous region 
than in a flat area. In general, the information is not available for all output and environmental 
characteristics. Many of these characteristics are therefore omitted from the cost function 
specifications.   
Unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity can be taken into account with conventional 
fixed or random effects in a panel data model. However, in these models all the unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity is considered as inefficiency. In order to distinguish 
heterogeneities such as external network effects from cost efficiency, Greene (2003, 2004) 
proposed an approach that integrates an additional stochastic term representing inefficiency in 
both fixed and random effects models. As shown in those papers, assuming that the 
inefficiency term follows a distributional form, both models can be estimated. In this paper 
we use a ‘true random-effects’ model, which is a random-constant frontier model, obtained by 
combining a conventional random-effects model with a skewed stochastic term representing 
inefficiency. The extended model includes separate stochastic terms for latent heterogeneity 
and inefficiency. Therefore, it should in principle, be able to provide better estimates of 
inefficiency.  In addition, since many of the unobserved factors, especially those related to the 
network’s shape, are likely to be correlated with the output and perhaps other explanatory 
variables, the random-effect estimators of the cost function coefficients could be biased. To 
overcome this shortcoming, the ‘true random-effects’ model has been adjusted for correlation 
between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables using Mundlak’s (1978) 
formulation.3  
                                                          
3 The application of Mundlak’s adjustment in frontier models has been proposed by Farsi et al. (2003). 
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The success of these recently developed panel data models4 could lend certain support 
to the application of benchmarking methods in the regulation of strongly heterogeneous 
network industries such as Swiss railways. Provided that they can sufficiently control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms, these methods can be used to estimate an order of 
magnitude for the sector or individual companies’ cost-inefficiency. In addition, in the case of 
railway networks, such analyses can be used to evaluate the bidding offers for the future 
tendering processes predicted by the new public transport policy.5 
The purpose of this paper is to study the potential advantages of these extended models 
in an application to Switzerland’s railway companies. In particular, our eventual interest is in 
models that can exploit the advantage of a fixed-effects model to have an unbiased estimate of 
the cost function without compromising the estimates of inefficiency scores. The models are 
estimated for a sample of 50 railway companies operating in Switzerland from 1985 to 1997. 
The alternative models are compared regarding the cost function slopes and inefficiency 
estimates. The conventional FE estimators of the cost function coefficients are assumed to be 
unbiased, thus used as a benchmark to which other models are compared. For the inefficiency 
estimates, the correlation between different models and the effect of econometric specification 
have been analyzed. The results suggest that the inefficiency estimates are substantially lower 
when the unobserved network effects are taken into account.  
                                                          
4 Greene (2003), Farsi et al. (2003) and Alvarez et al. (2003) are examples of application of such models in 
efficiency analysis. 
5 In line with the EU policy the Swiss government has introduced important regulatory reforms in the public 
transport system. The new policy act predicts a tendering process for the provision of regional railway services. 
The new system is believed to introduce greater incentives for competitive behavior. However, given the limited 
number of bidding companies in most regions, it is not clear to what extent these measures lead to efficient 
production.  
 5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present the model 
specification and the methodology respectively. The data are explained in section 4. Section 5 
presents the estimation results and discusses their implications, and section 5 provides the 
conclusions. 
 
2. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
A railway company can be considered as an aggregate production unit that operates in a 
given network and transforms labor and capital services and energy into units of transport 
services such as passenger-kilometers of public transport and ton-kilometers of freight. Given 
the extremely high number and types of different transport services, the measure of output 
requires an aggregation of outputs in one way or another.6  A practical way of getting around 
this approximation is to include output characteristics such as network length or average haul 
in the model. Different strategies have been used in the literature. Caves et al. (1985) used 
passenger-miles and freight ton-miles as output, and controlled for the average lengths of trip 
for freight and passengers and the number of route miles as output characteristics. Filippini 
and Maggi (1993) have considered a single-output production function with the number of 
wagon-kilometers as a measure of output and included the network length in their model 
specification. In their international analysis, Cantos et al. (1999) considered the aggregate 
number of passenger-kilometers and ton-kilometers as two outputs. Todani (2001) considered 
three types of wagon-miles (high-valued, bulk and others) as three main outputs and 
accounted for average length of haul and the number of road miles as output characteristics.  
                                                          
6 In the case of railways each relation between any two points in the space could be defined as an output type. 
From a practical point of view it is not possible to estimate a multi-product cost function with so many outputs. 
Therefore, an aggregation process is inevitable. 
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In this paper a two-output production process is assumed. The outputs are transported 
passengers measured by the total number of passenger-kilometers in a given year, and the 
transported freight measured as the aggregate number of ton-kilometers. The length of 
network is included in the model as output characteristics. Three input factors are considered: 
labor, capital and energy. A total cost function has been considered.  
Based on the above specification the total cost frontier can be represented by the 
following cost function:  
 
TC=f (Y, Q, N, PK , PL , PE , dt)      (1) 
 
where TC is the total annual costs; Y and Q are the numbers of passenger-kilometers and ton-
kilometers respectively; PK , PL  and PE  are respectively the prices of capital, labor and 
energy; N is the length of network and dt  is a vector including 12 year dummies from 1986 to 
1997 (year 1985 is the omitted category). The year dummies capture the cost changes 
associated with technical progress as well as other unobserved year-specific factors.7 
It is generally assumed that the cost function given in (1) is the result of cost 
minimization given input prices and output and should therefore satisfy certain properties.8 
Mainly, this function must be non-decreasing, concave, linearly homogeneous in input prices 
and non-decreasing in output. To estimate the cost function (1), a Cobb-Douglas (log-linear) 
                                                          
7 In the cost function estimations it is common to use a linear trend for technical progress. However, our 
preliminary regressions indicated that the time-variation of costs is strongly non-linear. In fact there is a gradual 
increase in the beginning of the sample period followed by a decrease in costs. These variations can be explained 
by many unobserved factors (such as changes in collective labor contracts or seasonal composition of the 
demand) that change uniformly across companies. 
8 For more details on the functional form of the cost function see Cornes (1992), p.106. 
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functional form is employed.9 The concavity assumption is automatically satisfied in this 
functional form. The linear homogeneity restriction can be imposed by normalizing the costs 
and prices by the price of one of the input factors. Here we considered the energy as the 
numeraire good. The other theoretical restrictions are verified after the estimation. The cost 
function can therefore be written as: 
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   with   i= 1, 2, ...., N   and    t = 1,2,…,Ti 
 
 
Subscripts i and t denote the company and year respectively, αi is a firm-specific effect and 
εit  is an iid error term. As we will explain in the next section, in the recent models proposed 
by Greene (2004), the stochastic term εit is composed of two parts: a skewed component 
representing inefficiency and a symmetric part for the random noise. 
 
3. ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
 
Stochastic frontier models have been subject of a great body of literature resulting in a 
large number of econometric models to estimate cost functions. Kumbhakar and Lovell 
9 As an alternative form we also evaluated the possibility of applying a translog functional form that can account 
for variation of scale economies with output. However, we decided to exclude this model because our study 
focuses on the efficiency estimates rather than scale economies. Moreover, the translog model requires a 
relatively large number of parameters, which creates certain numerical problems in the simulated likelihood 
maximization for the random-constant model. 
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(2000) provide an extensive survey of this literature. The main models used in this paper are 
based on Greene’s (2004) extension of the original frontier approach proposed by Aigner et 
al. (1977). In this framework, εit  as given in specification (2), is assumed to be a composite 
stochastic term with a normal-half-normal distribution, including both idiosyncratic effects 
and inefficiencies. The additional firm-specific term αi (see equation 2) represents the 
unobserved network heterogeneity and is assumed to have a normal distribution. This model 
is actually a stochastic frontier model in line with Aigner et al. (1977) with a random constant. 
This model is developed by Greene (2004) and is referred to as a “true” random-effects 
model.10 The estimation method is based on simulated maximum likelihood.   
The results are compared with other alternative models such as the fixed-effects model 
proposed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and the random-effects model proposed by Pitt and 
Lee (1981). Both these models are covered by the general form given in (2) with the 
difference that in the former model αi is a fixed effect and εit  is a zero-mean error term with 
no distribution restriction, and in the latter (Pitt and Lee) model αi is a random effect with 
half-normal (or truncated normal) distribution and εit  is a normal random error term. 
A summary of the five models used in the paper is given in table 1. The first model is a 
fixed effects (FE) model. In this model the firm-specific effects are considered as constant 
parameters that can be correlated with the explanatory variables. The coefficients are 
estimated through “within-firm” variations and therefore, are not affected by heterogeneity 
bias.11 In the cost frontier literature the inefficiency scores are estimated as the distance from 
                                                          
10 The name “true” is chosen to show that the model keeps the original frontier framework and the extension is 
done only by including an additional heterogeneity term.  
11 The term “heterogeneity bias” was used by Chamberlain (1982) to refer to the bias induced by the correlation 
between individual effects and explanatory variables in a random-effects model. See also Baltagi (2001) for an 
extensive discussion of fixed-effects (within) estimators.  
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the firm with the minimum estimated fixed effect, that is }ˆmin{ˆ ii αα − , as proposed by Schmidt 
and Sickles (1984). 
 
Table 1. Econometric specifications of the stochastic cost frontier 
 
 
Model I 
 
FE 
Model II 
 
RE 
Model III 
 
Pooled 
Model IV 
 
True RE 
Model V 
True RE with 
Mundlak 
adjustment 
Firm-
specific 
component 
αi 
Constant Half-normal N+(0, σα2) None N(0, σα
2) 
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εit= uit+ vit 
uit~N+(0, σu2) 
vit~N(0, σv 2) 
 
εit= uit+ vit 
uit~N+(0, σu2) 
vit~N(0, σv 2) 
 
Inefficiency 
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E it i itu α ε +   
 
 
E it i itu δ ε +   
 
 
 
Model II is a random effects (RE) model proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981), which is 
estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The firm’s inefficiency is estimated using 
the conditional mean of the inefficiency term proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982),12 that is: 
1 2E , ,  ... Ei i i i iα ω ω α ω  =     where it i itω α ε= +  and 
1
1 iT
i
i tT
itω ω
=
= ∑ .  The important limitation of 
this model is the assumption that the firm-specific stochastic term αi, which represents the 
firm’s inefficiency, is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Although it could be 
reasonable to assume that the firm’s cost-inefficiency is not correlated with exogenous 
variables,13 the firm-specific stochastic term may contain other unobserved environmental 
                                                          
12 See also Greene (2002b). 
13 Note that here the cost-efficiency does not include scale efficiency. 
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factors, which may be correlated with explanatory variables. Moreover, in both models (I and 
II), inefficiency indicators may include unobserved environmental factors, thus may overstate 
the firms’ inefficiency. There are however two factors that may exacerbate this problem in the 
FE model. First, unlike the RE model, the firm-specific effects do not follow a single 
distribution, thus can have a relatively wide range of variation. Secondly, these effects can be 
correlated with the explanatory variables, thus can also capture the heterogeneity factors that 
are correlated with the regressors. Whereas in the RE model in which the firm-specific effects 
are by construction uncorrelated with the regressors, these factors are suppressed at least 
partially through the “between” variations, into the regression coefficients. 
In the first two models (I and II), the firm’s inefficiency is assumed to be constant over 
time, thus captured by the firm-specific effects, while in other models inefficiency can vary 
across years. Model III is a pooled frontier model in that the sample is considered as a cross-
section and its panel aspect is neglected. The random error term is divided into two 
components: a normal error term vit capturing the noise and a half-normal random term uit 
representing the inefficiency as a one-sided non-negative disturbance.  This model is based on 
the original cost frontier model proposed by Aigner et al. (1977). The firm’s inefficiency is 
estimated using the conditional mean of the inefficiency term E it it itu u v +  , proposed by 
Jondrow et al. (1982). 
Models IV and V are extensions to model III that include an additional firm-specific 
random effect (αi) to represent the unobserved heterogeneity among firms. Model IV is 
Greene’s (2002a,b) true RE model.14  In this model it is assumed that the unobserved cost 
differences across firms that remain constant over time, are driven by network-related 
unobserved characteristics rather than inefficiency. Given the relatively long period covered 
                                                          
14 This model is a special case of a stochastic frontier model with random parameters (in this case random 
intercept).  
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in the data (12 years on average), this is a realistic assumption. The inefficiency term is 
assumed to be an iid random variable with half-normal distribution. This implies that the 
inefficiency is not persistent and each period brings about new idiosyncratic elements thus 
new sources of inefficiency. This is a reasonable assumption particularly in industries that are 
constantly facing new technologies. Therefore there are two justifications for such a 
specification in network industries: The first one is a practical assumption that persistent cost 
differences are related to unobserved heterogeneity across networks and the second one is 
based on the conjecture that the sources of inefficiency in network industries are dominated 
by new technology shocks and the incomplete adaptation of managers facing them.  
Model V is an extension of model IV that uses Mundlak’s (1978) specification to 
account for the potential correlation of unobserved network heterogeneity with the 
explanatory variables. Mundlak’s adjustment15 can be written as an auxiliary regression given 
by:  
i iX iα γ δ= +   
1
1 iT
i i
i t
tX XT =
= ∑ , 2~ (0, )i N δδ σ      (3) 
where Xit is the vector of all explanatory variables and γ is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients. Equation (3) actually divides the firm-specific stochastic term into two 
components: The first part can be explained by exogenous variables, whereas the remaining 
component (δi) is orthogonal to explanatory variables. The advantage of this model is that it 
allows for a time-variant inefficiency term while minimizing the heterogeneity bias. The 
heterogeneity bias can be avoided to the extent that the auxiliary equation can capture the 
correlations.16  
                                                          
15 See also Hsiao (2003), pp. 44-46, for an extensive discussion of Mundlak’s formulation. 
16 Notice that the heterogeneity bias would be zero if the error term (εit) were symmetric. In this case it can be 
shown that Mundlak’s adjustment turns the estimator into a within estimator.  
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In our comparative analysis we consider two aspects of the models’ performance. The 
first dimension is the estimation of the cost function’s coefficients.  In railway companies the 
operating costs are affected by network characteristics, which may be correlated with 
explanatory variables such as network’s size and input factor prices. For instance, larger 
networks are more likely to have more complex shapes. Denser networks are usually located 
in areas with higher population density, where wages are relatively high. Such relationships 
imply a positive correlation between the output level and labor price with the network 
complexity, which is not fully captured by the included factors in the model. The Hausman 
test is used to confirm that the firm-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables. In this case the FE estimators (model I) are unbiased, thus provide a benchmark to 
which other models can be compared.  
The second aspect of the models’ performance concerns the inefficiency estimates. It is 
important to note that the consistency of slopes (coefficients) does not necessarily imply that 
inefficiency estimates are unbiased. Interestingly, the empirical results suggest that there is a 
trade-off in estimations. Namely, models (like the FE model) with a good performance on 
slopes have strongly biased inefficiency estimates.17 Roughly speaking, the heterogeneity bias 
may be suppressed into the slopes as it appears in the RE model, or into the efficiency 
estimates as observed in the FE model. Farsi et al. (2003) provide a discussion on this issue. 
The results of that study on a sample of nursing homes suggest that Mundlak’s formulation 
can be helpful to reduce the heterogeneity bias in both slopes and inefficiency estimates at the 
same time. In this paper we use a similar approach to study if such a conclusion can be 
applied to a network industry.  
One should bear in mind that the inefficiency estimation requires a certain interpretation 
of the stochastic terms in the model. In the frontier literature, starting from Aigner et al. 
                                                          
17 See Farsi et al. (2003) for a discussion of this point. 
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(1977), it is commonly accepted that the skewed stochastic term with a certain distribution 
represents inefficiency. For instance a half-normal distribution through its zero mode, implies 
that any company is most likely to be completely efficient. Moreover, implicit in this model is 
the assumption that inefficiency is uncorrelated with all exogenous variables and also with the 
idiosyncratic variations reflected in the symmetric error term.18  This is a legitimate and 
helpful assumption from a practical point of view. In fact, through this assumption all the 
inefficiencies that are somehow related to exogenous variables such as factor prices and 
output are excluded from the firm’s productive inefficiency. Later studies like Cornwell et al. 
(1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992) extended the original framework to include exogenous 
variables in the distribution of the inefficiency term. However, in this paper we maintain the 
original assumption such that the efficiency measures are restricted to the sources that are 
completely uncorrelated with all exogenous variables, which by definition are beyond the 
firm’s control. The only exception is the FE model (model I) that allows any correlation of 
inefficiency scores. Furthermore, we assume that the inefficiency can vary over time, thus for 
the inefficiency estimates we focus on models III, IV and V. 
 
4. DATA 
 
The data set used in this paper is extracted from the annual reports of the Swiss Federal 
Office of Statistics on public transport companies. The companies operating in main urban 
centers are excluded from the sample. Most of these companies operate inner-city tramways 
and buses, whose functioning is quite different from trains. We also excluded one other 
company whose extremely low total costs and energy expenses suggest the possibility of a 
                                                          
18 Here, cost inefficiency is defined as the excess costs due to the firm’s technical problems or to suboptimal 
allocation of resources. Thus, scale inefficiencies, which are related to suboptimal output, are excluded.  
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reporting error. The final sample includes 50 railway companies over a 13-year period from 
1985 to 1997. The sample is an unbalanced panel with number of periods (Ti) varying from 1 
to 13 and with 45 companies with 12 or 13 years, resulting in 605 observations in total.19 The 
available information for any given year includes total costs, labor and energy expenses 
separately, total number of employees, the quantity of consumed electricity, network length, 
total number of seats, and total number of train-kilometers, passenger-kilometers and ton-
kilometers.  
Capital costs are calculated as the residual costs after deducting the labor and energy 
expenses from the total costs. These costs are mainly related to equipment and materials. 
Total number of seats is used as a proxy for capital stock.20 Thus, the capital price is 
calculated as the residual expenses per seat. The passenger and freight outputs are 
respectively measured by the number of passenger-kilometers and ton-kilometers. In 
Switzerland, each railway company is required to run a certain minimum number of trips per 
day for any given connection, specified by the cantonal regulators. Therefore, the number of 
train-kilometers or wagon-kilometers could be also an appropriate measure of passenger 
output. However, in order to be consistent with the recent literature21 and also given that there 
is a high correlation between train-kilometers and passenger-kilometers (a correlation 
coefficient of 0.97 in our sample) we adopted the number of passenger-kilometers and ton-
kilometers. All the costs and prices are adjusted for inflation using the Switzerland’s global 
price index and are measured in 1997 Swiss Francs.   
                                                          
19 The average number of periods in the sample is 12 years. For 37 companies, the data are available for 13 
years. Eight other companies have 12 years available. The number of years available for the remaining five 
companies is respectively 1, 3, 7, 7 and 10.  
20 See Filippini and Prioni (2003) for a similar approach. 
21 Some recent examples are Mancuso and Reverberi (2003), Estache et al. (2002), Cantos et al. (1999) and 
Banos-Pino et al. (2002).   
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (605 observations) 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Median Min. Max. 
Total annual costs 
(TC) CHF million  26.73 49.88 8.83 2.12 307.43 
 
Passenger output (Y) 
×106 passenger-kms 30.80 55.10 10.00 0.41 311.00 
 
Average cost (CHF 
per passenger-km) 1.20 0.76 1.09 0.33 5.98 
 
Goods output (Q)  
×106 ton-kilometers 10.20 52.70 0.27 0.00015 477.00 
 
Network length (N) 
(km) 39.43 56.64 22.82 3.90 377.00 
 
Capital price (PK) per 
seat (CHF '000) 4.53 2.13 4.03 1.04 14.47 
 
Average labor price 
(PL) per employee 
per year (CHF '000) 86.05 6.48 86.09 60.93 104.93 
 
Energy (electricity) 
price (PE) CHF/ kWh 0.157 0.023 0.158 0.076 0.265 
      
 
 
- All monetary values are in 1997 Swiss Francs (CHF), adjusted for inflation by Switzerland’s 
global consumer price index. 
 
 
 
Table 2 provides a descriptive summary of the main variables used in the analysis. As it 
can be seen in this table, the total costs show a high variation in the sample. The average cost 
of a passenger-kilometer varies from 0.3 to about 6 Swiss Francs. There is also a considerable 
variation in input prices and both outputs in the sample. Given the importance of within 
variations in most panel data models (especially the fixed-effect model), it is helpful to 
distinguish these variations from the variations across companies. Table 3 gives a summary of 
“within” and “between” variations for the main variables used in the regressions. As it can be 
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seen in this table, the dependent variable and most explanatory variables show a fairly 
considerable amount of within variation, supporting the use of a fixed-effect model. As 
expected, the within variation of network length is relatively low (limited to 7 percent).  
 
 
Table 3. Within and between variations (50 companies and 12 years on average) 
 
Standard Deviation  Mean Overall Between Within 
Fraction of 
within variation 
ln
E
TC
P
   
 11.31 1.10 1.12 0.15 0.14 
 
ln (Y)  16.32 1.34 1.34 0.12 0.09 
 
ln (Q)  12.49 2.72 2.78 0.61 0.22 
 
ln (N) 3.20 0.91 0.93 0.06 0.07 
ln K
E
P
P
   
  10.18 0.44 0.39 0.19 0.43 
ln L
E
P
P
   
 13.22 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.62 
      
 
- For each variable (X) the between standard deviation is based on companies’ average values that 
is: 
1
1 iT
i
i t
itX XT =
= ∑ ; and the within standard deviation is based on deviations from companies’ 
averages ( it iX X− ). The overall and within statistics are calculated over 605 company-years 
and the between statistics are calculated over 50 companies. The fraction of within variation is 
calculated as the ratio of within to overall standard deviation. 
 
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
The estimation results for the five models are given in table 4. These results show that 
the output and input price coefficients are positive and highly significant across all models. 
The estimated coefficients show a considerable variation across different models. The 
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estimates from the pooled model (III) are particularly different from those of other models. 
The year dummies are mostly significant and suggest that the cost variation over time is not 
linear. Again, the pooled model is an exception in which none of these dummies show any 
statistically significant effect. Noting that model III completely ignores the panel structure of 
the data, its estimates are likely to be strongly biased by omitted firm-specific variables. On 
the other hand the fixed-effects estimators (model I) are derived from the within-firm 
variations and thus unbiased.   
The year dummy coefficients (excluding model III) show that the total costs of railway 
companies rose almost linearly from 1985 to 1992 with an average annual growth rate of 
about 1.6%, but declined after 1992 with an average rate of about 1.5% per year. Since total 
costs and all the continuous explanatory variables are in logarithms, the estimated coefficients 
can be interpreted as average cost elasticities. For instance, the output coefficients suggest that 
on average a one percent increase in passenger-kilometers will increase the costs by 0.11 to 
0.49 percent depending on the adopted specification. The marginal effect of ton-kilometers is 
about 10 times lower, suggesting substantially lower variable costs for goods transportation. 
The coefficient of network length indicates that the marginal cost of a one percent extension 
in the network keeping the output constant, is approximately equivalent to 0.4 percent 
increase in costs. These results are consistent with the previous empirical results regarding 
Switzerland’s railroad industry (cf. Filippini and Maggi, 1993) in that they suggest increasing 
returns to scale. Following Caves et al. (1985), parameters αY , αQ and αN  can be employed to 
calculate the value of the economies of scale and density.22 All the results obtained from 
                                                          
22 Economies of density (ED) are defined as the proportional increase in total costs brought about by a 
proportional increase in both outputs, holding all input prices and the size of the network fixed. Economies of 
scale (ES) are defined as the proportional increase in total costs resulting from a proportional increase in both 
outputs and the size of the network, holding all input prices fixed. See Jara-Díaz and Basso (2003) and Oum and 
Waters (1996) for a discussion on the definition and interpretation of scale and density economies.  
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different models suggest that the Swiss railway companies do not fully exploit the potential 
scale and density economies. 
Table 4 also indicates that if the pooled model is set aside, the input price coefficients do 
not vary significantly across different models. The coefficient of labor price, varying between 
.55 and .57 (bar model III), is actually comparable to the average share of labor expenses, 
which is about 52% in the sample. The capital price coefficient varies between .31 and .32 
(model III excluded), which is considerably below the average share of capital costs in the 
sample (44%). This result may suggest that the companies are not so responsive as a 
constantly cost minimizing behavior should be, to the changes in capital prices. This can be 
explained by the fact that in the short run railway companies cannot vary much of their capital 
stock such as equipment and machinery.  
Comparing the results from different models in table 4 shows that excluding model III, 
all other models have reasonably comparable coefficients. In model III (pooled model) 
variations over time and within firms are treated exactly similar to those between different 
firms. Moreover, the unobserved firm-specific effects are completely neglected, which may 
bias the estimations. A Lagrange Multiplier test on an OLS model strongly rejects the 
hypothesis that the residuals of a given company are uncorrelated (test statistic of 2990 for a 
chi-square with 1 degree of freedom), suggesting that the pooled model is mis-specified.  
Moreover, the Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the firm-specific effects are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (test statistic of 61.5 for a chi-square with 17 
degrees of freedom). This result suggests that models that do not account for these 
correlations can give biased results. Given the relatively high number of periods (on average 
12 years) and the reasonable within-company variations (see table 3) in the sample, the fixed 
effects model’s results can be considered as unbiased estimates of the cost function 
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parameters. Therefore, the coefficients estimated from model I are used as a benchmark for 
assessing the potential heterogeneity bias in other models.  
Compared to model I, the parameter estimates in the pooled model (III) have the highest 
differences. The estimated coefficients in the remaining models are fairly close to those of the 
FE model, suggesting that heterogeneity biases in the coefficients are not substantial. This 
statement does not apply to the inefficiency estimates, which as we will see later, show 
considerable biases. As seen in table 4, there is no clear distinction between models II and IV 
concerning the heterogeneity biases. While in certain coefficients model IV is closer to the 
unbiased estimates (model I), in some others model II shows a ‘better’ performance.  
The random effects specification in both models II and IV has however a shortcoming in 
that the firm-specific heterogeneity terms (ui in model II and αi in model IV) are assumed to 
be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. If we put any trust in the Hausman 
specification test, this assumption is not realistic. Moreover, as discussed earlier, it is 
plausible that some of the unobserved network characteristics be correlated with the network 
length. Such correlations are taken into account in model V through the auxiliary coefficients 
(γx). The results in table 4 indicate that model V shows the smallest differences with the 
unbiased estimators of model I. This suggests that applying Mundlak’s (1978) adjustment to 
the TRE model (model IV) can decrease the heterogeneity biases. As shown in the table, the 
auxiliary coefficients (γx) are all significant. These coefficients can be interpreted as the 
correlation effect between the unobserved firm characteristics and the corresponding 
explanatory variable. For instance, the positive signs of γY and γQ suggest that keeping all 
observed factors fixed, networks with higher outputs are more likely to belong to the ‘high-
cost’ or ‘difficult’ networks; and the negative signs of γN, γK and γL suggest that larger 
networks and companies that have higher input prices are more likely to be in the ‘low-cost’ 
category.  
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Table 4. Regression results 
 
 Model I FE 
Model II 
RE 
Model III 
Pooled 
Model IV 
True RE 
Model V 
True RE + 
Mundlak 
αY .114* 
(.032) 
.200* 
(.030) 
.492* 
(.015) 
.133* 
(.023) 
.106* 
(.034) 
αQ .014* 
(.006) 
.021* 
(.003) 
.030* 
(.006) 
.038* 
(.004) 
.017* 
(.003) 
αN .448* 
(.051) 
.485* 
(.039) 
.393* 
(.026) 
.432* 
(.015) 
.488* 
(.035) 
αK .318* 
(.017) 
.310* 
(.010) 
.171* 
(.032) 
.312* 
(.008) 
.315* 
(.009) 
αL .546* 
(.037) 
.548* 
(.029) 
.592* 
(.074) 
.568* 
(.036) 
.562* 
(.034) 
γY _ _ _ _ .159* 
(.050) 
γQ _ _ _ _ .090* 
(.013) 
γN _ _ _ _ -.150* 
(.056) 
γK _ _ _ _ -.189* 
(.067) 
γL _ _ _ _ -.193 
(.180) 
α1986 .010 (.015) .009 (.041) .009 (.056) .022 (.027) .017 (.035) 
α1987 .020 (.015) .012 (.031) .003 (.056) .032 (.025) .029 (.031) 
α1988 .039* (.015) .028 (.044) .010 (.057) .051 (.037) .049 (.050) 
α1989 .065* (.016) .052 (.046) .036 (.057) .076* (.033) .074 (.050) 
α1990 .084* (.016) .068 (.036) .024 (.058) .097* (.034) .94* (.044) 
α1991 .098* (.017) .078* (.029) .030 (.058) .114* (.028) .111* (.035) 
α1992 .111* (.017) .094* (.034) .046 (.058) .130* (.026) .122* (.034) 
α1993 .100* (.017) .081* (.034) .015 (.057) .119* (.026) .112* (.034) 
α1994 .082* (.017) .063 (.040) -.001 (.056) .103* (.037) .093* (.039) 
α1995 .059* (.016) .048 (.032) .019 (.057) .081* (.023) .064 (.034) 
α1996 .037* (.017) .028 (.024) .027 (.057) .066* (.022) .043 (.025) 
α1997 .038* (.018) .030 (.032) .019 (.060) .063 (.039) .042 (.032) 
α0 _ -4.90* 
(.57) 
-8.31* 
(.98) 
-3.89* 
(.51) 
-1.89 
(2.66) 
σα _ _ _ .783* 
(.027) 
.751* 
(.058) 
2 2
u vσ σ σ= +   _ 
.807* 
(.14) 
.464* 
(.001) 
.109* 
(.005) 
.095* 
(.005) 
u vλ σ σ=  _ 
 
11.37* 
(3.81) 
2.88* 
(.30) 
2.58* 
(.56) 
1.59* 
(.031) 
 
 
- Standard errors are given in brackets. *  means significant at less than 5%. 
- The sample includes 605 observations (50 railway companies). 
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 Table 5 provides a descriptive summary of the inefficiency estimates from different 
models (see table 1, last row). These estimates represent the relative excess cost of a given 
firm compare to a minimum level that would have been achieved if the firm had operated as 
efficiently as the ‘best practice’ observed in the sample. In comparing different models it 
should be noted that in the first two models (I and II), the inefficiency is assumed to be 
constant over time. Moreover, in these models all the unobserved firm-specific differences are 
interpreted as inefficiency. As expected, both models I and II, especially the FE model, 
predict rather unrealistic inefficiency scores averaging about .7 to .8 and up to a maximum of 
2 to 2.5. According to these models, a typical company can save about a third of its costs by a 
more efficient allocation of resources. These high values indicate that the heterogeneity across 
companies is an important driver of cost differences and that neglecting it may create a 
substantial upward bias in inefficiency scores.      
 
Table 5. Inefficiency measures 
 
 Model I FE 
Model II 
RE  
Model III 
Pooled 
Model IV 
True RE 
Model V 
True RE 
with 
Mundlak 
Mean 0.813 0.696 0.343 0.078 0.063 
Median 0.676 0.662 0.289 0.061 0.053 
Maximum 2.507 1.992 0.848 0.386 0.311 
95 percentile 1.723 1.470 0.848 0.187 0.134 
Minimum 0.000 0.160 0.060 0.011 0.012 
N 605 605 605 605 605 
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In model III the inefficiency estimates are in a more realistic range, with an average of 
.34 and a maximum value of .85. These values though still too high to be convincing, are 
substantially lower than those predicted by models I and II; and this despite the fact that the 
pooled model (III) does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. This attenuation of 
inefficiency estimates can be explained by the structure of the inefficiency term in model III. 
Given that the inefficiency term (uit) is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed over time and across companies, it cannot fully capture the firm-specific 
differences that are time-invariant, thus such differences are partly suppressed into and bias 
the model’s coefficients.  
Both models IV and V, which have separate stochastic terms for inefficiency and firm-
specific heterogeneity, have quite reasonable inefficiency estimates about 6 to 8 percent on 
average and 31 to 38 percent on maximum. The substantial decrease in these values compared 
to other models, suggests that these models can separate to a considerable extent, the 
heterogeneity from the inefficiency. To understand the reasons behind these results, it is 
helpful to note that the sole difference between models III and IV is that model IV includes an 
additional firm-specific random term (αi). This term represents the variations across firms, 
which are about 7 times larger than the variation within firms (compare σα to σ in the lower 
panel of table 4).  
Given that the unobserved heterogeneity is potentially correlated with the explanatory 
variables, and that these correlations are not taken into account in model IV the resulting 
inefficiency scores may capture some of these differences. This issue can be explored by 
comparing models IV and V. In model V the time-invariant cost differences across companies 
are separated from inefficiency estimates (as in model IV). In addition, the possible 
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correlations with explanatory variables are mitigated through auxiliary coefficients. The 
results in table 5 show that when such correlations are controlled for (model V), the 
inefficiency estimates slightly decline (by about .015 on average and by .075 on maximum). 
According to this model the average (median) company is only 6.3 (5.3) percent inefficient, 
and the maximum inefficiency in 95 percent of the sample is limited to 13.4 percent. These 
results suggest that model V not only provides unbiased, or close to unbiased, estimates of the 
cost function’s coefficients, it can also better separate the heterogeneity from inefficiency. 
The pair-wise correlation coefficients between the inefficiency estimates from different 
models are listed in table 6. In order for the correlation coefficients to be comparable, they are 
calculated at the firm level using 50 observations (one observation for each firm). Namely, in 
models with time-variant efficiency, the inefficiency score is calculated as the firm’s average 
inefficiency score over the sample period. For models with time-variant inefficiency the 
correlation coefficients are also given over the 605 observations.  
As shown in table 6, models I and II, and models IV and V show a relatively high 
correlation.23 However, except a few cases the correlation coefficients are quite low, 
suggesting substantial differences across models.24 Especially, models IV and V show a 
negative correlation with all other models. Given that the correlation coefficients are 
calculated on company-average inefficiency scores, the weak (and negative) correlations may 
suggest that the inefficiency estimates vary considerably from one year to another, in which 
case the correlation between models with constant and time-variant inefficiency should be 
weak. However, this can only partly explain the observed correlations. In fact the positive and 
fairly strong correlation between the pooled model III (with time-variant efficiency) and both 
                                                          
23 These results are consistent with Farsi et al. (2003) who used a similar methodology for a sample of nursing 
homes. 
24 The rank correlations show similar patterns. These results are omitted to avoid repetition. 
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models I and II (with time-invariant efficiency) indicates that averaging cannot explain the 
negative correlations.  
 
Table 6. Pair-wise correlation between inefficiency estimates  
 
 Model I FE 
Model II 
RE 
Model III 
Pooled 
Model IV 
True RE 
Model V 
True RE 
with 
Mundlak 
Model I 1     
Model II .932* 1    
Model III .497* .614* 1   
Model IV -.247 -.256 -.158   [.092*] 1  
Model V -.334* -.320* -.197   [.105*] 
.948* 
 [.971*] 1 
 
- The correlation coefficients have been estimated over the firms (50 observations) that is, average 
values over the sample period are used in models with time-variant inefficiency (III, IV and V). 
- Correlation coefficients based on 605 observations are given in brackets. 
- *  means significant at 5%. 
 
The negative correlation coefficients (table 6) point to a striking distinction between the 
models IV and V and all other models, which do not distinguish unobserved heterogeneity 
from inefficiency. The negative correlations manifest especially in model V in which the 
correlations with observed factors are taken into account. These values suggest that some of 
the unobserved network characteristics may actually be negatively correlated with company’s 
average inefficiency. One interpretation is that the relatively complex thus costly networks are 
more likely to be operated by an efficient management. This is a plausible explanation 
because the companies with complex networks are more likely to have a general awareness 
and perhaps the required expertise for technical problems. Such expertise can directly or 
indirectly contribute to the firm’s efficiency. The results in table 6 highlight the importance of 
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unobserved heterogeneity, as failure to account for such factors can result in a completely 
misleading and even reverse picture of inefficiencies.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Alternative cost frontier models applied to a panel of Swiss railway companies indicate 
that the estimations particularly the inefficiency estimates, are sensitive to the adopted 
specification. The data show a considerable unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity that is 
likely to be correlated with explanatory variables.  In such cases unbiased coefficients can be 
obtained from the fixed effects model. This model’s estimates of inefficiency are however 
unrealistic. In fact, comparing the results across different models suggest that the inefficiency 
estimates largely depend upon how the unobserved heterogeneity across firms is specified. 
Panel data models such as Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) that do not 
distinguish between unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and inefficiency can overestimate 
the overall inefficiencies or even give misleading patterns of inefficiency. The cost frontier 
random effects model labeled as ‘true’ random-effects model (Greene, 2004) provides 
reasonable estimates of inefficiency confirming that the inefficiency estimates in other models 
are confounded with unobserved heterogeneity such as network effects. However, the 
problem of this model is that because of potential correlation between heterogeneity and 
explanatory variables, the cost function coefficients may be biased (heterogeneity bias), 
especially as the Hausman specification test confirms the presence of such correlations. 
Using an auxiliary equation in line with Mundlak (1978) can be helpful in this regard. 
This adjustment has been applied to the ‘true’ random effects. The resulted specification not 
only proves a very low level of heterogeneity bias, it slightly reduces the inefficiency 
estimates. The high correlation between the inefficiency estimates across the two models 
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suggests that in so far as the heterogeneity is accounted for, the correlation between 
heterogeneity and explanatory variables does not considerably affect the inefficiency 
estimates.  
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